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Extraterritoriality and the Regulatory Power of the United 
States: Featured Issues of Sovereignty, Legitimacy, 
Accountability, and Democracy 
By: Alina Veneziano 
Abstract 
Extraterritoriality is a negative form of transnationalism.  It cre-
ates a paradox among state regulatory power because extraterritori-
ality can both govern the conduct of the state and also constrain the 
state in reacting to future transnational changes.  In governing the 
state, extraterritoriality provides the state with the power to impose 
standards to control the activities within its borders.  On the other 
hand, extraterritorialty constrains the state by hindering multi-state 
progression towards more efficient transnational developments.  
States have traditionally captured their autonomy in sovereignty, but 
extraterritorialty challenges this notion.  This was an inevitable re-
sult, as extraterritoriality became a natural consequence that result-
ed from globalization and technological advancements.  In this study, 
the criminal extraterritorial enforcement mechanisms of the U.S. Ex-
change Act of 1934 will be offered as an example of state extension 
within the broader context of the transnational world.  However, 
there is one problem with the current predicament and trend: since a 
state’s borders are blurred in modern securities transactions, the 
state – the United States – is excessively expanding its reach due to 
this form of transnationalism – extraterritoriality.  This extension of 
U.S. law abroad is unfortunate.  While extraterritoriality is a legal 
way to regulate conduct via prescriptive jurisdiction, it creates prob-
lems relating to (1) sovereignty, (2) legitimacy, (3) accountability, 
and (4) democracy.  Regarding state sovereignty, the very definition 
of extraterritoriality comprises the extension of a state’s law upon the 
foreign conduct of another state’s nationals.  Current uses of extra-
territoriality by the United States are arbitrarily applied without the 
consent of those affected and, because of this, pose a severe threat to 
both the territorial and economic sovereignty and integrity of other 
states.  Analyses into legitimacy reveal that people are uncomfortable 
with this process because of the degree of coercion that results from 
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the judiciary’s ability to formulate additional standards in its case 
holdings.  This use is also counter-productive in that it diverts the fo-
cus away from victims and perpetrators and instead redirects atten-
tion on methods of enforcement.  With extraterritoriality, the United 
States is gaining different regulatory constituents, namely foreigners; 
however, the United States is not accountable to these foreign actors.  
This may include the U.S. adjudication of claims with little to no con-
nection to the United States.  Furthermore, extraterritoriality hinders 
a state’s right to self-determination since its basic notion is the impo-
sition of another state’s law upon it with no consent.  It also under-
mines the structure of the United States’ democracy, including its 
system of government by creating complications between the U.S. 
branches regarding the separation of powers.  Additionally, even 
though extraterritorial applications by the United States depict the 
state as a purported strong player in the international sphere, it in-
stead produces a transformed state that risks foreign infringement 
through this form of regulatory power.  A better approach is one that 
transcends state public law, abandons the over-reliance on U.S. ex-
traterritoriality, and comports with modern objectives of internation-
al cooperation and development, such as forms of either procedural 
and substantive harmonization. 
Introduction 
Illustrating the Problem 
As globalization meets technological advancements, transnation-
al criminal activity is perpetrated by new opportunities and with in-
novative capabilities, resulting in a perplexing challenge for the mod-
ern state in regulation and enforcement mechanisms.  Exacerbating 
this challenge is the legal exercise of the reliance on the extraterrito-
riality of U.S. public regulatory statutes to solve transnational crimes.  
However, despite its legality, specific issues have arisen that chal-
lenge the utilization of extraterritorial application of criminal statuto-
ry provisions to reach foreign nationals, such as concerns as to state 
sovereignty, legitimacy, accountability, and democracy.  The United 
States has, in recent decades, used its authority to apply criminal stat-
utes to substantively reach foreign activity.  The blame for this is 
usually given to the “complexities, inventions, and limitations of our 
modern, transient world” that tend to include “the velocity and capac-
ity of individuals to commit criminal acts while finding ways to avoid 
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capture.”1  Nevertheless, the question remains as to how the state 
should respond to these challenges. 
As an illustration, the U.S. Exchange Act of 1934, specifically 
Section 10(b), provides for criminal liability if certain elements are 
met, including willfulness.  As will be discussed, although it has re-
cently been held that the presumption against extraterritoriality ap-
plies to criminal statutes, the judiciary has nevertheless found ways to 
evade its scope and formulate new standards to reach foreign con-
duct.  Thus, this study concludes that extraterritoriality is a negative 
form of transnationalism.  It creates a paradox2 among the regulatory 
power of the United States by virtue of its ability to both govern and 
constrain the state.  As a state-based driver of transnational law, ex-
traterritoriality empowers the state with the power – not necessarily 
the international authority – to formulate novel standards/tests to de-
termine the propriety of extending domestic law abroad.  And, as 
these practices to govern regulatory conduct expand and become ex-
cessive, its use was tempered by judicial and political-imposed re-
straints, such as the presumption, comity considerations, interest-
balancing, or deference.  Whether these restraints are effective tools 
is a debated topic; however, its function has been to bestow and to 
acknowledge the obligation of United States to regulate their borders 
and control the activities within it. 
On a similar, slightly contradictory note, the overreliance on ex-
traterritoriality constrains the state by hindering further transnational 
developments and efforts towards multi-lateral agreements.  This 
constraint includes the reluctance and inability to respond to global 
changes, which can be a necessity in reacting to a transnational 
 1. See Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, The Myopia of U.S. v. Martinelli: Ex-
traterritorial Jurisdiction in the 21st Century, 39 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 15
(2007).
 2. See Dan E. Stigall, Ungoverned Spaces, Transnational Crime, and the Prohibition on
Extraterritorial Enforcement Jurisdiction in International Law, 3 Notre Dame J. Int’l
L. 1, 2, 5 (2013) (Professor Stigall traces the evolution of transnational criminal activi-
ties and observes the “increased need by domestic law enforcement agencies to con-
duct extraterritorial law enforcement operations” in areas where there is no govern-
mental counterpart willing to take on such a task.  In referring to the basic principles of
statehood, sovereignty, and territory, Stigall observes how a scheme of sovereign func-
tions with limited external interferences can “mitigate[] conflict in certain respects”
(for example, assist in governing the state) but can also “give[] rise to problems asso-
ciated with transnational crime” (for example, constraining the regulatory power of the
state).  This is the paradox described above).
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world.  Through the unilateral expansion of its domestic laws abroad, 
the United States can inject its presence in the international sphere 
with little to no accountability to those who are affected by the reach 
of its laws.3  This form of hegemonic power has the logical conse-
quence of creating a desire in the United States to dominate interna-
tionally and, as a result, deters the willingness of the United States 
towards progressing in transnational developments.  As the proceed-
ing parts will demonstrate, this trend impedes transnationalism. 
Outline 
This study will reveal how, why, and to what extent the over-
reliance on extraterritoriality – particularly when utilized by the Unit-
ed Sates – impedes transnational law developments and efforts at 
promoting and responding to global changes.  It proceeds in the fol-
lowing order.  Part II utilizes the criminal provisions of the U.S. Ex-
change Act as an example of a public regulatory statute and discusses 
its initial implications in a transnational world.  It proceeds to de-
scribe the Morrison, Vilar, and Bowman Trilogy as specific illustra-
tions of opinions in U.S. jurisprudence discussing extraterritoriality 
and the extension from the civil to criminal context. 
Part III gives a background on extraterritoriality and the re-
straints developed to regulate states, such as the presumption against 
extraterritorialty.  It then outlines the purpose and consequences of 
this practice by the United States, including the motivations behind 
the actions of the United States and reactions by foreigners.  Part IV 
examines extraterritoriality in a transnational world and discusses the 
main critiques of current practices that relate to the following four 
principles: (1) sovereignty, (2) legitimacy, (3) accountability, and (4) 
democracy.  Within each respective sub-part, the criminal provisions 
of the Exchange Act will be used to further demonstrate how such 
critiques of a U.S. public regulatory statute operate in a transnational 
world. 
Part V considers the negative implications from this trend, such 
as the complications with foreign relations matters and the politi-
 3. See Austen L. Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism, and the Retreat from Extraterritoriality,
28 Md. J. Int’l L. 208, 220 (2013) [hereinafter, Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism] (ob-
serving how extraterritoriality “became a way to expand the sphere of American influ-
ence without having to worry about the constraints that international treaties impose”).
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cal/economic considerations that make it difficult for the United 
States to conceive of alternative solutions.  It then discusses how to 
plan for a transnational solution and the possibilities within the crim-
inal enforcement mechanisms of securities laws.  Part VI provides the 
conclusion to this study; namely, that global extraterritorial regula-
tion by the United States impairs transnationalism. 
Criminal Provisions under Section 10(b) of the U.S. Ex-
change Act as A Form of Public Law 
Introduction 
Public law is defined as “the law of relationships between a gov-
ernment and those whom it governs.”4  Examples of pubic law are 
most easily illustrated through fields of law such as constitutional 
law, administrative law, procedural law, and criminal law.  This study 
utilizes the criminal provisions of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
as an example of a public regulatory statute enacted by the United 
States to govern the conduct of those within its control.  This exam-
ple is utilized to effectively place its effects within the modern, trans-
national world.  The purpose of this sub-part is to provide back-
ground definitions and context that are necessary for understanding 
the dangerous implications of extraterritorialty in a transnational 
world.  The context is confined to our above illustrated example of 
criminal provisions of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. 
Though linked to a state-based driver of transnational law, extra-
territoriality has emerged as a form of transnationalism.  Transnation-
al law is not easily susceptible to a commonly accepted definition.  
However, Professor Roger Cotterrell notes that transnational law of-
ten “refers to extensions of jurisdiction across nation-state bounda-
ries, so that people, corporations, public or private agencies, and or-
ganizations are addressed or directly affected by regulation 
originating outside the territorial jurisdiction of the nation-state in 
which they are situated, or interpreted or validated by authorities ex-
ternal to it.”5  It is in the interest of dominant states, such as the Unit-
ed States, to assist in the development of transnational law to assert 
 4. See Michal Tamir, Public Law as a Whole and Normative Duality: Reclaiming Ad-
ministrative Insights in Enforcement. Review, 12 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 43, 44 (2006).
 5. See Roger Cotterrell, What Is Transnational Law?, 37 Law & Soc. Inquiry 500, 501
(2012).
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its presence in the global sphere.  For example, in utilizing the extra-
territorial application of its own laws, the United States is unilaterally 
extending its state’s reach upon foreign states/nationals, resulting in a 
system of blurred borders and, consequently, altered sovereignty of 
the affected states.  Though state extension has the added benefits of 
familiarity due to its ties to a recognized state, its practice by the 
United States is seen as politically hegemonic and as an inappropriate 
solution for transnational developments because transnational law is 
something distinct from domestic and international law, requiring dif-
ferent solutions.  However, its use continues simply because the 
United States has decided that it wants to extend its power in this 
field of law – specifically within the securities law context.  In other 
words, the United States – via its criminal public regulatory statute, 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act – can respond to new develop-
ments of transnationalism in one of two ways: (1) extending the state, 
or (2) transcending the state.  It chose to extend. 
The Morrison, Vilar, and Bowman Trilogy 
Morrison, Vilar, and Bowman have one thing in common: they 
highlight the significance of the presumption against extraterritorialty 
– whether implicitly or explicitly – in an attempt to limit foreign in-
fringements.  This sub-part aims to provide a brief summary of these
opinions and their implications.  Its purpose is to reinforce this pa-
per’s conclusion that extraterritorialty hinders transnationalism with
specific examples from U.S. caselaw.
To begin, criminal law was traditionally confined within the ter-
ritorial borders of the enacting state.6  Extraterritoriality challenged 
this tradition.  Due to the “increased [] potential for transnational 
criminal securities fraud” from technological advancements, the con-
cept of extraterritoriality was developed as “an immediate response to 
such challenges.”7  Section 10(b) forbids “any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
 6. See Edgardo Rotman, Extraterritorial Criminal Enforcement of Securities Fraud
Regulations after United States v. Vilar, 70 U. Miami L. Rev. 53, 58 (2015) (describ-
ing criminal law as the “stronghold of territoriality”).
 7. Id. at 59; see also Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 1, at 45 (noting the parallel between
the “greater willingness to extend the extraterritorial effects of domestic criminal law”
and the “social changes and technological advances”).
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the public interest or for the protection of investors.”8  Section 32(a) 
provides that “[a]ny person who willfully violates any provision of 
this chapter . . . or any rule or regulation thereunder” shall be crimi-
nally liable.9  In all cases, it is the state that regulates the underlying 
provisions of the Exchange Act, including the cause of action, reme-
dies, enforcement procedures, etc. 
Within the securities context, extraterritorial application of U.S. 
securities law soon became commonplace.  From Schoenbaum10 to 
Leasco11 and Bersch/Vencap12 to Kasser,13 the willingness of the 
United States in utilizing extraterritorial application sharply in-
creased.  Cases from Hartford Fire/Empagran14 to Morrison,15 on the 
other hand, demonstrated a purported cut-back in its over-reliance.  
Morrison, decided in 2010, was a monumental decision in that it 
held, in a majority opinion by Justice Scalia, that the extraterritorial 
application of the Exchange Act reach is a merits question, not one of 
subject matter jurisdiction and that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear 
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”16  After con-
cluding the “focus” of the statute to be upon the purchases and sales 
of securities in the United States,” the “transactional test” was formu-
 8. See 15 USC § 78j (Section 10(b), Manipulative and deceptive devices).
 9. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Section 32(a), Penalties) (emphasis added); see also Steve
Thel, Taking Section 10(b) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement of SEC Rules, 2014 Col-
um. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 12 (2014) (noting how Section 10(b) can “trigger[] criminal sanc-
tions under section 32, which apply to rules whose violation is made ‘unlawful’ by the
Exchange Act”).
 10. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1968) (developing
the “effects” test).
 11. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336 (2d Cir.
N.Y. 1972) (developing the “conduct” test).
 12. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 992 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1975); see also
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1975) (decided on the same day
concluding that more than “merely preparatory activities” is needed, though the “per-
petration of fraudulent acts” is sufficient).
 13. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. N.J. 1977) (justifying extraterritoriality
based on policy reasons and to prevent the United States form becoming a “Barbary
Coast” for harboring defrauders).
 14. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 818-20 (1993); see also F. Hoff-
mann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004) (finding extraterrito-
rial application in Sherman Act despite strong dissent by Justice Scalia only to change
positions entirely about ten years later to hold that the Act did not apply extraterritori-
ally in an attempt to limit infringements with other sovereigns).
 15. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
 16. Id. at 254-55.
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lated, which holds that Section 10(b) applies only to “securities listed 
on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities 
. . . .”17  The implications of Morrison have shown to be far-reaching, 
as the transactional and domestic “focus” test deny relief to anything 
foreign.  This is not to imply that extraterritorial application in certain 
situations needs to be extended further; instead, it lends credence to 
the assertion that the solution – a transnational solution – does not 
necessarily depend upon extraterritorialty.  However, one thing these 
cases do have in common is that they are all confined civilly.  This 
changed in 2013 with the Vilar decision in the Second Circuit.18 
The Vilar opinion is often cited for its extension of the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality to the criminal context.  What is seldom 
mentioned is its reference, reliance, and subsequent incorporation of 
a 1922 Supreme Court opinion, United States v. Bowman.19  Bowman 
concerned the application of a criminal statute to foreign conduct.  In 
Bowman, as re-emphasized in Vilar, the Supreme Court held that the 
requirement of an explicit statement from Congress regarding extra-
territoriality “should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as 
a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Govern-
ment’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the Gov-
ernment to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud . . . .20  Like 
Morrison, Bowman was also a case of statutory construction. 
Since Bowman, courts have found “implied extraterritoriality”21 
for many offenses.  It is this “implied” qualifier that forms the bases 
of many problems concerning foreign infringement and judicial arbi-
trary decision-making.  Furthermore, adding Vilar into the trilogy 
produces the holding that the presumption, as reinvigorated from 
Morrison, extends to criminal statutes.22  Its justification was to avoid 
the “dangerous principle” that allows the judiciary to give the same 
statutory provision – Section 10(b) – different meanings in different 
contexts.23 
 17. Id. at 266-67.
 18. See United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2013).
 19. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
 20. Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
 21. See Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 1, at 35.
 22. Vilar, 729 F.3d at 74.
 23. Id. at 75.
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Thus, we now have a multi-part test when analyzing the extrater-
ritoriality of a criminal statute.  First, if statute gives a clear indica-
tion that it applies extraterritorially, then it will be extended abroad 
(Morrison).24  Second, when there is no clear indication, the next step 
turns on whether the statute at issue prohibits (1) a crime against the 
government such as the right of the government to defend itself 
against obstruction or fraud or (2) a crime against private individuals 
or their property (Bowman).25  Regarding the first option, statutes that 
prohibit crimes against the government may be applied extraterritori-
ally, even in the absence of clear congressional intent.  On the other 
hand, for the second option, statutes that prohibit crimes against pri-
vate persons or their property are not applied extraterritorially, unless 
Congress clearly indicates otherwise.  
If the answer to the first two questions is “no,” then the statute 
has no extraterritorial application.  Liability can then only be found 
where the “focus” of the statute is construed by the courts to be on 
domestic conduct (Morrison).26  As the presumption also applies to 
criminal statutes, “Section 10(b) is no exception” since the same stat-
ute provides for both civil and criminal liability (Vilar).27  A graphical 
representation of this multipart test is represented directly below. 
 24. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
 25. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.
 26. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266.
 27. Vilar, 729 F.3d at 74.
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As demonstrated above, the courts as well as lawyers must now 
use the legacy of Morrison, Vilar, and Bowman in determining 
whether a federal criminal statute can reach foreign nationals and/or 
foreign conduct.  But the problem remains, as stated at the beginning 
of this paper: these holdings can and do vary depending on the text of 
the statute and the interests the court decides that the statute is in-
tended to protect.  Thus, this process gives the claimant in these crim-
inal statutory cases not two, but three chances of proving that U.S. 
law should apply to their case (as shown in red above). 
A Brief Background on Extraterritoriality of Criminal Pro-
visions under the U.S. Exchange Act 
ILS Journal of International Law Vol. VI, No. 2 
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Definition: Extraterritoriality and the Presumption Against Ex-
traterritoriality 
This sub-part provides additional background information into 
extraterritoriality and its restraints.  Extraterritoriality involves “the 
application of federal and state law to conduct that takes place at least 
partially outside the territory of the United States . . . .”28  Its applica-
tion is undertaken in one of three ways: prescriptive (legislative) ju-
risdiction, adjudicative jurisdiction, or enforcement jurisdiction.29 
In an attempt to limit the blatantly excessive effects of extraterri-
toriality, several safeguards were established, such as the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality,30 an interest-balancing approach,31 or 
comity considerations.32  The most important of these safeguards has 
been the presumption against extraterritoriality, which instructs 
courts to begin with the presumption that “Congress is primarily con-
cerned with domestic conditions.”33 
However, this presumption is easily rebuttable; for example, the 
Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law, Tentative Draft No. 
3, mandates that the presumption be applied unless there is a clear 
 28. See Curtis A. Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System 169 (Oxford Uni-
versity Press) (2d ed. 2015); see also Austen L. Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdic-
tion, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1673, 1679 (2013) [hereinafter Parrish, Evading Legisla-
tive Jurisdiction] (“[W]hen Congress uses a basis of jurisdiction other than territorial
jurisdiction, Congress has regulated extraterritorially”).
 29. See Anthony J. Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 Cornell L. Rev.
1303, 1348-49 (2014) [hereinafter Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?]
(noting that jurisdiction “comprises at least three different aspects, ordinarily referred
to as prescriptive jurisdiction, adjudicative jurisdiction, and enforcement jurisdiction”)
(emphasis added).
 30. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (The presumption is a canon of
construction which declares that “legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent ap-
pears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States”
and “is based on the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic
conditions”).
 31. See Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law 76 (2d ed., 2015) (noting that,
in addition to overcoming the presumption against extraterritoriality as a “threshold
requirement,” further tools of judicial restraint, such as interest-balancing, may also
need to be overcome).
 32. See New York C. R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1925) (In this Supreme
Court decision, Justice McReynolds took care to note that to subject a person to the
laws of another state where he did not commit any acts “not only would be unjust, but
would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comi-
ty of nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent”) (emphasis added).
 33. Foley Bros., Inc., 336 U.S. at 285.
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indication from Congress to the contrary.34  But a clear indication is 
not the same as a clear statement, implying that courts over time 
gained more discretion to discern congressional intent,35 such as the 
ability to use context, rely on policy considerations, or promote a 
purported U.S. interest.  It is this discretion that creates many prob-
lems in enforcing U.S. criminal securities laws in transnational cases 
adjudicated in U.S. courts. 
Purpose and Consequences 
The above sub-part provided a general definition of extraterrito-
riality; however, it did little to shed light on the damaging effects of 
the true nature of extraterritorial implications on states.  This sub-part 
will elaborate upon the purposes and developments of extraterritorial-
ity and delineate the major consequences that have resulted. 
To start, Professor Jay Lawrence Westbrook instead characteriz-
es extraterritoriality as a form of “sovereign regulation” because 
these “circumstances always involve multinational conduct of some 
kind.”36  Professor Austen Parrish, in agreement, notes that extraterri-
torialty is a “matter of convenience” that is used in lieu of interna-
tional law-making because it is “politically more expedient.”37  But 
why did this happen?  Among the reasons as to why this practice 
gained force are because conduct today more likely “materially im-
plicates the territories of more than one state.”38  Because there is no 
overarching transnational authority to regulate and enforce transna-
tional activity, the task falls to the states to regulate this conduct.  In 
noting this, it appears to be the dominant states that will take on this 
 34. See Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law: Jurisdiction § 203, pt. II, ch. 1
(Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017) (noting that federal statutes are to apply
only with the territory of the United States unless congressional intent says otherwise).
 35. See Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdiction, supra note 28, at 1674 (noting that in-
stead of engaging in statutory construction of statutes, “some courts have sidestepped
the issue of legislative jurisdiction entirely” and have “redefin[ed] extraterritoriality it-
self”); see also Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97
Va. L. Rev. 1019, 1046 (2011) [hereinafter Colangelo, , A Unified Approach] (observ-
ing that a rule based on location “may unintentionally sideline the political branches
even more by giving total discretion to judges to discern the statutory “focus” and
thereby circumvent the presumption altogether”).
 36. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Extraterritoriality, Conflict of Laws, and the Regula-
tion of Transnational Business, 25 Tex. Int’l L. J. 71, 74 (1990).
 37. See Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism, supra note 3, at 220.
 38. See Westbrook, supra note 36, at 76.
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challenge, either by regulating this conduct by agreement or regulat-
ing unilaterally, according to Westbrook.39  If not, “the conduct will 
not be regulated at all.”40 
As an easily predictable respondant, the United States became 
the leader in utilizing extraterritorial application.  In gaining power 
and control in the international sphere to develop transnational 
movements, several problems emerged.  For example, the reliance on 
extraterritoriality made “Congress gr[o]w generally indifferent to for-
eign concerns” and resulted in a “new legal orthodoxy that disfavored 
international law and promoted unilateral domestic regulation.”41  
Foreigners grew resentful of this practice, as U.S. cases throughout 
the decades displayed an increase in the use of extraterritoriality42 
that revealed inconsistent practices.43  In addition to these incon-
sistent practices, extraterritoriality has been utilized to serve the best 
interests of the United States, such as finding such application appro-
priate where it promote the U.S. government’s interests but refusing 
to find it where the U.S. government harms others.44 
Despite the above assertions, modern extraterritorial application 
of U.S. securities laws has been at times characterized by a somewhat 
 39. Id. at 77.
 40. Id.
 41. See Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism, supra note 3, at 221.
 42. See Austen Parrish, Chapter 12, The Interplay Between Extraterritoriality, Sovereign-
ty, and the Foundations of International Law, in Standards and Sovereigns: Legal His-
tories of Extraterritoriality 6 (2017) [hereinafter Parrish, The Interplay Between Extra-
territoriality] (noting that the “1990s and 2000s witnessed a dramatic increase in the
number of national laws applied to foreign conduct”).
 43. See Mark P Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The Perversion of
Democratic Governance, the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the Imperative of Es-
tablishing Normative Principles, 19 B. C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 297, 301 (1996)
(tracing the “vast majority of legislative and executive enactments” and, due to the
ambiguous language, noting how “the task of interpreting extraterritoriality from this
has fallen on the courts . . . .” who have “been no more consistent, on the surface at
least, than Congress”).
 44. See Branislav Hock, Transnational Bribery: When is Extraterritoriality Appropriate?,
11 Charleston L. Rev. 305, 307 (2017) (observing how “literature indicates that extra-
territorial enforcement might also serve national self-interests, thus destabilizing mar-
kets, principles of international order, or international relations between states”); see
also Gibney, supra note 43, at 316 (noting that “while the United States has been very
quick to regulate a myriad of phenomena in the world that have, or are perceived as
having, a negative effect on U.S. interests, the United States has tended to ignore those
situations where its government or corporate entities have had a negative effect on
others”).
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cautionary approach that considers the relationship of U.S. extraterri-
toriality on foreign affairs.  For example, these different forms of for-
eign infringement in asserting criminal jurisdiction resulted in the de-
velopment of jurisdictional restraints, as discussed above – such as 
the limitations on a government’s jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudi-
cate, and to enforce – that operate in order to “regulate[] particular 
types of juridical behavior on the part of states.”45  But upon closer 
examination, recent restraints have proven ineffective.  For example, 
since this concept involves unilateral action, there is no consent of 
other states; there is just the continued action of the United States “in 
the political realm” with the “superficial veneer of legality.”46  Simi-
larly, Parrish makes this notation as well, claiming that courts have 
tended to “[e]vad[e] legislative jurisdiction” and to do this represents 
“an approach that privileges and fosters unilateralism while under-
mining traditional international law-making . . . .”47  This failure of 
the restraints and persistent abuse of extraterritoriality are among the 
many factors that hinder further developments at transnationalism. 
The Concept of Extraterritoriality in A Transnational World 
Extraterritoriality as An Attack on State Sovereignty 
Extraterritorialty challenges sovereignty because it transgresses a 
state’s borders and results in an unnecessary and arbitrary expansion 
of the state’s reach.  The presumption against extraterritoriality de-
veloped when principles of sovereignty were strongly adhered to, 
even internationally.48  This implies that territorial sovereignty plays 
a role today; however, the opposite is true.  While the critique in this 
sub-part does not intend to imply that the loss of sovereignty is either 
completely good or completely bad, it does intend to assert that extra-
territorial applications by the United States inappropriately attack 
 45. See Stigall, supra note 2, at 11.
 46. Id. at 10 (concluding that extraterritoriality “enables the U.S. to create law, without
being bound by it” and provides “evidence of a hegemonic state seeking to exempt it-
self from the world system”).
 47. See Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdiction, supra note 28, at 1707.
 48. See Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 94
B.U. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2014) (“The presumption against extraterritoriality has its historical
roots in the emphasis on territorial sovereignty in international law”); see also William
S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption against Extraterritoriality, 16 Berkeley J.
Int’l Law. 85, 113 (1998) [hereinafter Dodge, Understanding the Presumption] (“The
original justification for the presumption against extraterritoriality was based in inter-
national law”).
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state sovereignty by infringing upon foreign states in an attempt to 
regulate the conduct of other states’ nationals. 
The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is credited as bestowing the 
notion of state sovereignty and stands for the proposition that “the 
world is divided into discrete territories that are controlled in their en-
tirety by individual and co-equal sovereign authorities” and “implies 
the absolute authority” to enforce laws within its own territorial 
boundaries.49  As additional states were formed, sovereignty was rec-
ognized as a form of state independence.50  However, this traditional 
definition no longer guarantees the equal authority of the state as the 
center source of power due to the rise of extraterritoriality.  For in-
stance, when we speak of extraterritorial applications of criminal 
provisions of securities fraud within the Exchange Act, several nor-
mative issues arise such “non-intervention, comity, and sovereign 
equality.”51  These concepts are interrelated in that they all refer to 
the need for respect and deference of other sovereigns under interna-
tional law principles. 
However, with transnational activities, such as cross-border se-
curity transactions, “decisionmakers are doomed to step on some 
sovereign’s toes either by regulating or by not regulating.”52  The 
most damaging infringements identified are those that relate to the 
“domestic legal processes and control of its criminal justice appa-
ratus”53 such as extraterritorial application by a dominant state upon 
foreign nationals. 
However, because it is usually a foreign national – not the for-
eign state itself – that is aggrieved in these situations, the state’s 
rights under international law are not infringed.  Instead, the resent-
ment by the affected state against the dominant state exerting extra-
territorial application “represents more a desire to prevent economic 
harm to its nationals or corporations than an assertion of the rights of 
 49. See Stigall, supra note 2, at 8-9; see also Alan M. Simon; Spencer Weber Waller, A
Theory of Economic Sovereignty: An Alternative to Extraterritorial Jurisdictional
Disputes, 22 Stan. J. Int’l L. 337, 345 (1986) (noting that sovereignty “directly focuses
on the rights of individual states in an international system based upon the equality of
states”).
 50. See Simon & Waller, supra note 49, at 346.
 51. See Rotman, supra note 6, at 59.
 52. See Westbrook, supra note 36, at 90.
 53. See Stigall, supra note 2, at 10.
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the state.”54  For this reason, and because the traditional understand-
ing of sovereignty has been rendered slightly outdated,55 a more ap-
propriate notion to sovereignty may include the recognition of eco-
nomic sovereignty, as opposed to the traditional territorial 
sovereignty.56  Alan Simon advanced this theory to “acknowledge the 
increased significance of economic forces,” “facilitate necessary eco-
nomic transactions between and among states,” and “preserve eco-
nomic activities closely linked to the existence of the state.”57 
As applied to criminal enforcement mechanisms under the Ex-
change Act, the economic sovereignty of foreign states is also en-
croached.  This is because, as the law currently stands under the Mor-
rison, Vilar, and Bowman Trilogy, the transactional test causes a 
severe reduction in foreign capital flow.  In denying relief to foreign 
transactions, U.S. investors are less likely to invest in foreign security 
markets and thereby less likely to diversify their portfolios interna-
tionally to reduce risk.58  Furthermore, foreign investors are less like-
ly to transact in U.S. securities due to the United States’ arbitrary and 
inconsistent decision-making that are perceived as unfair and contra-
ry to self-governance.59  Thus, current practices of extraterritoriality 
by the United States appear to attack both the territorial and econom-
ic sovereignty of other states. 
Problems of Legitimacy in Utilizing Extraterritorial Application 
Enforcement mechanisms must be legitimate, especially when 
crossing state boundaries and when dealing with transnational activi-
ties.  Before proceeding, it is necessary to note that there is nothing in 
 54. See Simon & Waller, supra note 49, at 344.
 55. Id. at 347 (“As the nature of the international order changed, so too did the use of the
term sovereignty. The definition of breach of sovereignty expanded to include eco-
nomic concerns”).
 56. Id. at 348 (emphasis added) (Simon and Waller draw an important distinction between
territorial sovereignty and economic sovereignty.  “Many examples blur the distinction
between the territorial and economic rights of states” and “the realities of the modern
international economic system often render the distinction between territorial and eco-
nomic rights meaningless”).
 57. Id.
 58. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of
American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 207, 226 (1996).
 59. See Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdiction, supra note 28, at 1701 (“[L]aws that
regulate foreign conduct are often perceived to be antithetical to basic notions of fair-
ness and self-governance”).
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and of itself prohibited with extraterritoriality; it is a legally recog-
nized form of transnationalism.  However, while extraterritoriality is 
a legal way to regulate conduct via prescriptive jurisdiction, it creates 
legitimacy and structural concerns.  A critique of legitimacy in utiliz-
ing extraterritoriality leads us to one fundamental question: are we 
comfortable with this process?  This is the focus of this sub-part.  To 
answer this question requires a consideration of the degree of coer-
cion present and what this practice is creating. 
First, the United States – as the dominant nation in utilizing ex-
traterritoriality – exhibits forms of coercive and competitive power.  
For example, even though the presumption against extraterritoriality 
has been reinvigorated in an attempt to curb excessive extraterritori-
alty, the ability of the judiciary to formulate additional standards and 
exceptions renders the purpose of the presumption meaningless, thus 
depriving future litigants of consistency and predictability in case 
holdings.  This is also illustrated by the anxiety that foreigners have 
from the fear of being subject to U.S. law.60  In concluding the same, 
Professor Austen Parrish observes the relationship between extraterri-
torialty and “empire-building and the unseemly bullying of smaller 
nations by great powers.”61 
Second, Parrish notes how extraterritorialty “runs the risk of be-
ing counter-productive.” 62  For instance, among the many conse-
quences associated with extraterritorialty by the United States include 
“turning the focus away from the victims and the perpetrators . . . and 
instead redirect[ing] global attention to the methods of enforce-
ment.”63  Thus, extraterritorial regulation is viewed as something “il-
legitimate” with deep-seated foreign resentment.64  It is these features 
that make us anti-internationalists and undermine multilateral coop-
eration. 
 60. See Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 Am. J.
Comp. L. 579, 582 (1983) (noting the coercive effects of extraterritorialty by those
“who might believe themselves likely later to become subject to judicial jurisdiction in
United States courts”).
 61. See Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism, supra note 3, at 216.
 62. Id. at 233.
 63. Id.
 64. See Austen L. Parrish, Morrison, The Effects Test, and the Presumption Against Ex-
traterritoriality: A Reply to Professor Dodge, American Society of International Law
105th Annual Meeting Proceedings, 16 (2012) [hereinafter Parrish, Morrison, The Ef-
fects Test].
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Accountability Issues of Public Regulatory Statutes Abroad 
With extraterritoriality, the United States has gained additional 
constituents: foreigners.  However, the United States is not accounta-
ble to these foreign actors nor have these foreigners consented to the 
imposition of its laws.  This is the key to an accountability critique, 
as this sub-part demonstrates.  As discussed, current application of 
U.S. criminal securities laws extraterritorially raises issues of Ameri-
can exceptionalism, unilateral decision-making, excessive judicial 
discretion as well as creates foreign friction, breaches of comity, and 
harm to foreign investors/markets.  These problems stem from the 
simple inability of foreign nationals to exert an influence in the polit-
ical process.65 
Using the criminal provisions of Section 10(b) as our example 
demonstrates the self-interested nature of the United States.  For ex-
ample, the inconsistent case holdings and arbitrary standards for de-
termining the propriety of extraterritoriality have comported with 
U.S. interests only.66  This creates a lack of accountability of the 
United States to foreign investors.67 
The Democracy Concerns in Enforcement Proceedings Using 
Extraterritorialty 
The power of the state in passing legislation that may [not] have 
extraterritorial application or the ability of the courts to formulate 
standards and/or restraints in transnational cases creates issues con-
cerning the democratic nature of its process.  Such issues relate main-
ly to the notions that extraterritorialty is characterized by (1) control-
ling the unconsented, (2) hindering a state’s right to self-
determination, and (3) undermining the structure of the United States’ 
 65. Id. (observing that extraterritoriality can “impose obligations on individuals and
groups who have no formal voice in the political process and who have not consented
to those laws”); see Gibney, supra note 43, at 306 (noting how foreigners are “not
consulted about the application of foreign law to them, nor do they have the ready
means to change the law if it is not consistent with their own domestic standards and
norms”).
 66. See Gibney, supra note 43, at 304 (concluding that “U.S. law has been applied extra-
territorially when that has served the national interest of the United States”).
 67. Id. at 311 (noting the accountability issue between the state enacting the laws and the
affected people in the other states).
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system of government.  This sub-part will analyze the above criti-
cisms of extraterritorialty in relation to principles of democracy. 
First, extending the state’s criminal statutes to foreign activity 
creates problems regarding democracy that “impose national laws on 
foreign legal subjects who did not participate in their enactment.”68  
In fact, extraterritorial applications are in sharp contrast with the 
principles of democracy.  For example, Professor Mark Gibney notes 
that the basic notion of the democratic rule rests in “the consent of 
the governed.”69  However, extraterritoriality fails to satisfy this 
standard since it is merely a system whereby the United States is in a 
position to “pick and choose”70 which statutory provisions will have 
extraterritorial application. 
Second, this also impacts a state’s right to self-determination be-
cause the dominant state is arguably imposing its own law on unwill-
ing participants.  Using the Exchange Act as our example, Professor 
Edgardo Rotman observes that “[t]he most damaging effects of secu-
rities fraud . . . are that they create distrust toward the system and its 
healthy components.”71  The purposes of the Exchange Act are “to 
protect U.S. investors and the integrity of the U.S. capital markets.”72  
However, after considering Morrison’s new transactional and domes-
tic “focus” test and Vilar’s added complexities regarding criminal 
provisions, it is unlikely these goals are fulfilled.  For example, while 
it has been noted that Morrison/Vilar deny relief to American inves-
tors purchasing foreign shares, it has yet another harmful conse-
quence: the self-determination of foreign states is obstructed since it 
is possible for its nationals to be increasing captured by U.S. criminal 
law. 
Lastly, extraterritorial application by the United States attacks its 
democratic structure, such as the separation of powers.  Under this 
critique, Gibney asserts that its use is perpetrated “without any sem-
blance of a system of checks and balances.”73  The unpredictable in-
teraction between the judiciary and political branches is an example 
of this, as seen in the newly formulated transactional test by the judi-
 68. See Rotman, supra note 6, at 59.
 69. See Gibney, supra note 43, at 305.
 70. Id.
 71. See Rotman, supra note 6, at 63.
 72. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 58, at 224.
 73. See Gibney, supra note 43, at 307.
2018  University of Baltimore School of Law 
208 
ciary in Morrison followed by the subsequent, contradictory enact-
ment of Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank.74  Gibney sees instances 
such as this as the over-devotion of the judiciary in promulgating 
U.S. law abroad with scant attention to the interests of those bound 
“who lack the protections of U.S. law or the Constitution.”75 
These arguments are closely intertwined with the issues of legit-
imacy and accountability discussed above: extraterritoriality is in es-
sence not democratic because “the lawmakers in the country promul-
gating laws that will be enforced in other countries are not 
accountable to ‘the people’ in these other lands,” as they are “not 
consulted about the application of foreign law to them, nor do they 
have the ready means to change the law if it is not consistent with 
their own domestic standards and norms,”76 making people question its legitima-
cy.
Future Implications on the Regulatory Power of the United 
States 
Considering the Implications from This Trend 
Excessive extraterritorial applications have hegemonic implica-
tions that both stifle international cooperation and foreign capital 
flow.  Another dangerous consequence is that this practice has the 
ability to influence.  What is referred to here is the ability of the Unit-
ed States to create an example in utilizing extraterritoriality that other 
states may wish to use themselves to apply their own laws abroad – 
laws that do not comport with the values and legal system of the 
United States.77  For instance, Professor Austen Parrish notes that the 
practice of extraterritoriality is not limited to the United States; in 
fact, its use by other states is “hardly surprising,” he asserts, as it was 
the United States that created the “precedent” or “sense of righteous-
ness” in other states.78  Thus, the question to be explored in this sub-
part is as follows: How does this concept impact the regulatory power 
 74. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 929P(b), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1865 (2010).
 75. See Gibney, supra note 43, at 307.
 76. Id. at 305-06.
 77. See Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93
Minn. L. Rev. 815, 867 (2009) [hereinafter, Parrish, Reclaiming International Law]
(noting that other nations applying their domestic law extraterritorially is “problemat-
ic” because “[l]ittle reason exists to believe that foreign laws necessarily will be con-
sistent with Western concepts of justice”).
 78. Id. at 855.
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of the United Sates in today’s modern transnational world?  The main 
replies to this inquiry include the adverse implications on foreign re-
lation matters and political/economic considerations which indoctri-
nates a reluctance within the United States to conceive of different 
mechanisms to regulate foreign conduct. 
Because extraterritoriality involves the application of U.S. law as 
applied to foreign subjects, it connects to “foreign relations issues 
that have consequences for the United States.”79  These foreign rela-
tions issues can negatively affect the United States’ reputation inter-
nationally and in the eyes of its own citizens.  Regarding international 
consequences, an increase in the United States’ power is likely corre-
lated with a reduction in cooperation for international agreements; 
thus, this “often reflects an inability or unwillingness to engage mul-
tilaterally” and depicts the United States as an “isolationist.”80 
In addition, extraterritorial applications by the United States re-
late “not merely the question of moral values, but they also have im-
portant political and economic consequences.”81  The morality con-
cerns are easy, as extraterritoriality involves the regulation of other 
states’ nationals by a government who is not accountable to these 
people; it is plainly an unfair process.  The political and economic 
consequences include dampened relationships with other states re-
garding transnational cooperation and reduced foreign capital flow 
within the United States.  Furthermore, these considerations may cre-
ate a reluctance within the United States to change their current prac-
tices.  Professor Gibney elaborates upon the implications of this trend 
and notes that the increase in its use “will not change, and if any-
thing, the desire to apply U.S. law in other countries will only contin-
ue to grow.”82  While this is a regrettable situation, scholars have for-
tunately noted steps that can be taken to help reverse this trend, as the 
next part demonstrates. 
 79. See Clopton, supra note 48, at 3.
 80. See Parrish, The Interplay between Extraterritoriality, supra note 42, at 11; see also
Parrish, Reclaiming International Law, supra note 77, at 874 (noting that the United
States’ withdrawal from international law occurred at relatively the same time as the
dramatic increase in U.S. extraterritorialty and that this results in domestic law replac-
ing international law”).
 81. See Hock, supra note 44, at 312.
 82. See Gibney, supra note 43, at 307.
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Planning A Solution 
In planning the appropriate course of action, due consideration 
must be given as to whether that solution should continue to utilize 
extraterritoriality or instead whether a different mechanism should be 
explored.  This sub-part elaborates upon the preparation to be in-
volved at this stage. 
As a starting point, Professor Gibney notes how current extrater-
ritoriality practice “does not come close to resembling law-making in 
the domestic sphere.”83  This is because, as Gibney asserts, there is a 
gap in the United States’ “constitutional balance” that needs to be re-
stored; specifically, it is the political branches that need to be respon-
sible for creating the law and the judicial branch that must serve as 
the “check against governmental abuses.”84  In addition to the “estab-
lishment of normative principles,” this “attempt at balance” is needed 
to prevent the United States from fostering a system of applying its 
laws extraterritorially and enforcing them upon foreigners without 
any protection of the law.85 
Additionally, because the United States is a powerful dominant 
state in the global community, it has considerable influence in shap-
ing future transnational developments in how to best regulate foreign 
conduct in a way that reduces foreign infringement and respects in-
ternational comity.  What it currently lacks is the motivation and will-
ingness to initiate these changes. 
As a last note to keep in mind, Professor Parrish advances an in-
teresting possibility, which is what this study also intends to promote: 
“No clear reason exists why global regulation cannot be achieved 
through multilateral means.”86  For instance, he observes first how 
most scholarly literature asserts that extraterritorial regulation is nec-
essary in today’s world.  However, he rebuts this majority view by 
explaining that the reasons for this are “unclear” and supports this 
conclusion by noting a contradiction in U.S. history: “We have seen 
periods where the world’s economy was highly integrated, and yet 
domestic law remained strictly territorially prescribed.  And con-
versely, we have seen nations use extraterritorial laws aggressively, 
 83. Id. at 315.
 84. Id.
 85. Id. at 315, 319.
 86. See Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism, supra note 3, at 239.
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even during times of isolation.”87  Thus, it appears extraterritoriality 
is not dependent on the degree of globalization at stake.  In turn, we 
can conclude that its use is not necessarily needed nor desirable in a 
transnational, interconnected community. 
Possibilities 
In considering the above, how should the state respond to this 
practice?  Shall it be the continued extension of the United States 
abroad or a transcended form of public law?  While the former has 
the appeal of being tied to a state, this study has concluded that the 
notions of territory and sovereignty are becoming less important in 
our modern world or, simply, our focus is shifting to include new in-
terests.  Furthermore, the idea that extraterritoriality is linked to state-
based law is irrelevant in terms of predictability and comfort, as U.S. 
practice demonstrates several inconsistencies with this concept as 
well as arbitrary decision-making.  The appeal of transnationalism or 
some form of harmonization recognizes that transnational law is a 
novel concept deserving of novel approaches.  In considering the 
above ideas, this sub-part serves to elaborate upon the several exam-
ples of the next steps our globalized community can take regarding 
extraterritoriality, as applied to criminal enforcement of securities 
laws. 
Professor Harold Maier begins by concluding that these matters 
are “most appropriately carried out by diplomatic exchange, not by 
judicial decisions in which a forum balances its own interest against 
the competing interests of other states.”88  As we can see, the judicial 
system has been overly active in formulating standards and tests to 
determine the propriety of extraterritoriality in the securities context.  
This is illustrated by the judicially-formulated conduct tests, effects 
test, and even the transactional with domestic “focus” test.  Restraints 
such as the presumption or comity considerations are nothing more 
than creations by the United States to appease foreign resentment.  
Thus, the regulation of transnational activities and transnational con-
duct, according to Maier, must be based on the “fundamental premise 
that a state’s bona fide territorial interests will be recognized as legit-
 87. Id. at 238-39.
 88. See Maier, supra note 60, at 581.
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imate by the other members of the international community.”89  In 
other words, legitimacy and comity are the key elements advocated 
by Professor Maier that “validates the exercise of state power.”90 
Professor Westbrook asserts that “the only acceptable solution to 
regulation of transnational economic activity in the long run is inter-
national agreement . . . .”91  However, this is complicated to apply to 
criminal enforcement mechanisms of securities laws across states due 
to the inherent differences in market structures, sophistication in 
markets, disclosure requirements, individual cultures, etc.  Perhaps 
the more critical question is whether domestic regulation is a good 
start towards achieving this “international agreement” goal.  West-
brook argues that “only national regulation of multinational conduct 
will produce the necessary impetus to international agreement.”92  
This is because national regulation, he concludes, provides “an incen-
tive to agreement;” nevertheless, before this goal is achieved, the 
“values of transnational regulation” should always be considered.93 
Other forms of solutions, though overlapping with the above ap-
proaches, include efforts that transcend state borders – such as har-
monization.  These are more drastic measures, as they involve greater 
departures from state sovereignty.  For instance, Professor Hannah 
Buxbaum identifies two trends as forms of transnational solutions 
that have been circulating scholars for decades: a form of substantive 
harmonization or a form of procedural harmonization.  These can be 
accomplished via multilateral agreements and are promoted for their 
lack of unilateralism.94  Buxbaum states that the first is a form of uni-
fication and perhaps constitutes “the most fundamental disturbance” 
of sovereignty since it will literally replace domestic laws of individ-
ual states.95  On the other hand, the second form, Buxbaum asserts, 
 89. Id. at 584-85.
 90. Id. at 585.
 91. See Westbrook, supra note 36, at 92.
 92. Id. at 93.
 93. Id. at 95.
 94. See Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism, supra note 3, at 235-36 (Parrish notes that multi-
lateral approaches are “longer-lasting,” “avoid fragmentation,” and “are more con-
sistent with other international law principles and mechanisms.”  This is because such
approaches, such as treaties, “contain a degree of legitimacy that unilateral approaches
lack because multilateral agreements are more egalitarian and democracy reinforc-
ing”).
 95. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Sub-
stance, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 931, 947-48 (2002).
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are a set of harmonized rules for use in cross-border transactions that 
will not replace domestic law but nevertheless still constitute a “move 
away from sovereignty-based conflicts analysis . . . .”96  Whether 
these approaches can be effectively implemented depend on their de-
sirability and feasibility.  Thus, the overall implementation remains to 
be seen. 
Conclusion 
When analyzing the conditions and applicability of the extraterri-
toriality of U.S. criminal securities law provisions, it is obvious that 
its current use is unrestrained, arbitrary, and abusive.  Thus, it is a 
negative form of transnationalism.  Its use creates a paradox by giv-
ing the state to power to govern the activities within its borders but 
also constraining the state from developing potential transnational so-
lutions to criminal enforcement measures of securities laws.  The 
state’s public regulatory provisions can respond to this predicament 
by either extending the state or transcending it; the United States has 
chosen to extend. 
The current trajectory places the United States on a dangerous 
path that creates anxieties about future implications such as other 
states applying their laws extraterritorially.  The current uses of extra-
territorial applications of the criminal enforcement provisions of the 
U.S. Exchange Act was provided as an example of this trend.  The 
anxieties noted relate to notions of sovereignty, legitimacy, accounta-
bility, and democracy.  The critiques of these four preceding princi-
ples concluded the following regarding extraterritorial application: 
(1) it is an unconsented form of global regulation and infringes state
sovereignty; (2) it makes people uncomfortable with its legitimacy
because it is coercive and diverts attention away from its victims; (3)
it is a process by which the United States is not accountable to those
that are affected by its regulatory reach; and (4) it undermines the
self-determination of states as well as the democracy of the United
States, such as the separation of powers.
This study thus concluded that this practice by the United States 
was unfortunate and risks foreign infringement.  The practice of ex-
traterritorial applications has little benefits and the global community 
 96. Id. at 948.
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would be better off abandoning this process in its entirety as it relates 
to criminal enforcement mechanisms of cross-border securities trans-
actions.  The optimal approach should focus on developments and so-
lutions that transcend state borders, abandons the over-reliance on ex-
traterritoriality, and promotes transnational cooperation, such as 
efforts at harmonization. 
